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more. Measures of miscalibration are, contrary to theory, unrelated to measures of trading volume.
This result is striking as theoretical models that incorporate overcondent investors mainly motivate
this assumption by the calibration literature and model overcondence as underestimation of the
variance of signals. In connection with other recent ndings, we conclude that the usual way of
motivating and modeling overcondence which is mainly based on the calibration literature has to
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21 Introduction
Trading volume appears high in nancial markets. One quarter of the value of the annual
worldwide trade and investment 
ow is traded in the foreign exchange market (including
forwards, swaps, and spot transactions) each day.1 The annualized monthly turnover on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the last years was about 100 %. The number
of shares traded on the NYSE in the year 2004 was 367,098,489,000 and the daily value
of trading is currently about 55 billion.2 De Bondt and Thaler (1995) note that the high
trading volume observed in nancial markets \is perhaps the single most embarrassing
fact to the standard nance paradigm".3
Why do investors trade such enormous quantities? Rational investors must be heteroge-
neous for trade to be mutually advantageous for the buyer and the seller of an asset.
Dierences in information alone cannot explain high levels of trading volume. This is
a result of various no trade theorems, among them, for example, Milgrom and Stokey
(1982).4
Introduction of noise traders or liquidity traders who trade for reasons exogenous to
models helps to circumvent no trade theorems.5 This noise or liquidity trading is not
necessarily irrational. For example, endowment shocks, such as bequests or accidents, can
be interpreted as liquidity trading motives.6 But common sense suggests that ascribing
the high levels of trading volume mentioned above solely to noise or liquidity trading is
unsatisfying.7
Two further strands of literature have emerged that are able to explain high levels of
trading volume. These strands of literature are labeled as the \dierences of opinion"
1Dow and Gorton (1997), p. 1026.
2See www.nyse.com.
3De Bondt and Thaler (1995), p. 392.
4See, for example, Brunnermeier (2001), pp. 30-37, for a discussion of various no trade theorems.
5See Pagano and R oell (1992), p. 680, and Brunnermeier (2001), p. 31. Shleifer and Summers (1990) survey the noise
trader approach to nance.
6See, for example, Pagano and R oell (1992), p. 680.
7See also Hirshleifer (2001), p. 1564, and Wang (1998), p. 322.
3literature and the \overcondence" literature.8 We now shortly discuss these two strands
of literature in turn. A more comprehensive discussion will follow in Subsection 3.2.
The \dierences of opinion" literature was, among others, motivated by Varian (1985,
1989). Dierences of opinion can arise due to dierences in prior beliefs or due to dif-
ferences in the way investors interpret public information. Furthermore, it is assumed
that these dierences in beliefs or models for interpreting signals are common knowledge.
Although everyone knows that others have dierent opinions, there is no adjustment of
beliefs, i.e. investors \agree to disagree". Modeling dierences of opinion is mainly mo-
tivated by mere plausibility: dierences of opinion are present in every day life (see, for
example, Harris and Raviv (1993)). The models are usually silent about the reason why
there are dierences of opinion in the rst place. Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993),
and Kandel and Person (1995) show that dierences of opinion help explain high levels of
trading volume and that a higher degree of dierences of opinion leads to a higher degree
of trading volume.
The \overcondence" literature assumes that investors overestimate the precision of in-
formation. Overcondence models thus incorporate ndings of a large set of psycholog-
ical studies that are often referred to as the \calibration literature" (see, for example,
Lichtenstein, Fischho, and Phillips (1982)). However, overcondence models are usually
motivated by a richer set of psychological results that are often summarized as overcon-
dence.9 These theoretical models predict that overcondent investors trade more than
rational investors. De Bondt and Thaler (1995) argue that \the key behavioral factor
needed to understand the trading puzzle is overcondence".10
The discussion so far raises the following questions that our study will tackle empirically:
1. Is trading volume of an investor a function of the degree of miscalibration of the
respective investor as claimed by the \overcondence" literature?
2. Is the trading volume of an investor a function of other overcondence measures that
are often used as a motivation of overcondence models?
8Morris (1994) shows that even in a \dierences of opinion" setting no trade theorems can arise under certain conditions.
9We will discuss these further results in Subsection 3.1.
10De Bondt and Thaler (1995), p. 393.
43. Are the various overcondence measures used to motivate overcondence models
positively correlated?
4. Is there a psychological foundation of the \dierences of opinion" explanation of high
levels of trading volume?
We analyze these questions by correlating various overcondence measures with measures
of trading volume. A sample of approximately 3,000 individual investors with online bro-
ker accounts was asked to answer an online questionnaire which was designed to measure
various facets of overcondence, among them their degree of miscalibration. For the sub-
group of 215 respondents we are able to correlate overcondence measures and measures
of trading volume which are calculated by the trades over a 51 month period.
By correlating miscalibration scores with measures of trading volume we are able to
empirically test the hypothesis of overcondence models that, the higher the degree of
miscalibration (modeled as the degree of the overestimation of the precision of informa-
tion), the higher the trading volume of the respective investor. In addition, we explore
whether other biases which are often summarized as overcondence and are used to moti-
vate overcondence models are related to trading volume. Such an analysis is necessary to
guide modeling. Psychologists have found several judgment biases but it remains unclear
which bias aects economic behavior or whether these biases aect economic behavior at
all. These points are often put forth as a major drawback of behavioral nance models.
In this vein, Fama (1998) argues that \given the demonstrated ingenuity of the theory
branch of nance, and given the long litany of apparent judgment biases unearthed by
cognitive psychologists, it is safe to predict that we will soon see a menu of behavioral
models that can be mixed and matched to explain specic anomalies."11 This statement
shows the importance of analyzing the link or correlation between judgment biases and
economic variables such as trading volume as the only way to test which bias actually
in
uences economic behavior. Our paper is among the few recent papers that measures
psychological biases and correlates them with economic choices. Other recent examples
are Graham, Harvey, and Huang (2005) or Puri and Robinson (2005).
Furthermore, we are able to test whether there is a psychological foundation of dierences
11Fama (1998), p. 291.
5of opinion models by explicitly asking investors whether they assess themselves as above
average with regard to investment skills or past performance. We argue that an investor
who regards himself as above average is more likely to maintain a specic opinion about
the future performance of an asset even though he knows that other investors or the market
hold a dierent opinion. Note, that this dierence of opinion is the source of volume in
the \dierences of opinion" literature. By correlating measures of trading volume with
miscalibration scores and better than average scores, we are able to empirically evaluate
whether the \dierences of opinion" literature or the \overcondence" literature better
explains high levels of trading volume.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. Investors who think that they are above
average trade more. This nding is consistent with other recent studies (see Deaves,
L uders, and Luo (2003), Graham, Harvey, and Huang (2005), Hales (2005), Oberlechner
and Osler (2003)). Measures of miscalibration are, contrary to predictions of overcon-
dence models, unrelated to measures of trading volume. These results hold even when we
control for several other explanatory variables in a cross-sectional regression analysis. In
connection with other recent ndings, we conclude that the usual way of motivating and
modeling overcondence which is based on the calibration literature has to be treated
with caution. In line with other authors, we argue that the \dierences of opinion" litera-
ture better explains high levels of trading volume when compared to the \overcondence"
literature. Furthermore, our ndings are consistent with a psychological foundation for
the \dierences of opinion" explanation of high levels of trading volume. In addition, our
way of empirically evaluating behavioral nance models - the correlation of economic and
psychological variables and the combination of psychometric measures of judgment biases
(such as overcondence scores) and eld data - seems to be a promising way to better
understand which psychological phenomena drive economic behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related research, especially
other endeavors to test our main hypothesis and their drawbacks. Section 3 surveys over-
condence in the literature on heuristics and biases and in the nance literature. Section
4 describes the data set and the design of our study, especially our overcondence mea-
sures. Section 5 shows the results on the relation between measures of overcondence and
trading volume and presents several robustness checks and alternative interpretations of
6our results. Section 6 discusses the results and the last section concludes.
2 Related Research
Our analysis is related to other studies which share the common feature of correlating
proxies or measures of overcondence on the one hand and economic variables such as
trading volume on the other hand.
Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2004) use U.S. market level data to test the hypothe-
sis that overcondence leads to high trading volume. They argue that after high returns
subsequent trading volume will be higher as investment success increases the degree of
overcondence.12 They nd an increase in trading activity after bull markets: stock trading
volume (turnover) is positively related to lagged stock returns. This nding is consistent
with the hypothesis that a higher degree of overcondence leads to higher trading volume
as long as high past returns are a proxy for overcondence. Kim and Nofsinger (2003)
conrm these ndings using Japanese market level data. They identify stocks with vary-
ing degrees of individual ownership to test the hypothesis and discover higher monthly
turnover in stocks held by individual investors during the bull market in Japan.
The proxy for overcondence in Barber and Odean (2001) is gender. In their paper,
they summarize psychological studies that nd a higher degree of overcondence among
men than among women. Consequently, they partition their data set, a sample of U.S.
online broker investors, on gender. They nd that men trade more than women which is
consistent with overcondence models.
All the above mentioned studies share the shortcoming that overcondence is never di-
rectly observed. Only crude proxies for overcondence are used (past returns, gender). A
direct test of the hypothesis that a higher degree of overcondence leads to higher trading
volume is the correlation of measures of overcondence and measures of trading volume.
Our study uses this approach. Our research is thus related to the studies in economics
and nance that correlate psychological data (such as measures of overcondence) with
economic variables (such as trading volume). We will discuss such studies in the rest of
12See Subsection 5.3 for a further discussion of dynamic overcondence models.
7this subsection.
Fenton-O'Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, and Willman (2003) analyze the link between psy-
chological and economic variables empirically using data on the behavior of professional
traders. They measure illusion of control (Langer (1975), Presson and Benassi (1996)) by
a computer-based task. They nd that their measure of illusion of control is negatively
associated with performance as measured by traders' self-ratings, total annual earnings,
and the performance assessments of a senior trader-manager.13
Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) analyze experimentally whether psychological
traits and cognitive biases aect trading and performance. Based on the answers of 245
subjects (students) to a psychological questionnaire they measured, among other psycho-
logical traits, the degree of overcondence via calibration tasks. The subjects also partic-
ipated in an experimental asset market. They nd that overcondence (miscalibration)
reduces trading performance in the experimental asset market. However, their overcon-
dence measure is unrelated to trading volume. Contrary to predictions of overcondence
models, overcondent subjects do not place more orders.
Using data from several UBS/Gallup Investor Surveys, Graham, Harvey, and Huang
(2005) measure investor competence through survey responses. They nd that investors
who feel competent trade more often and have a more internationally diversied portfolio.
Puri and Robinson (2005) link optimism to major economic choices. They create a measure
of optimism using the Survey of Consumer Finance by comparing a person's self-reported
life expectancy to that implied by statistical tables. Optimists are more likely to be-
lieve that future economic conditions will improve. In addition, they tilt their investment
portfolios more toward individual stocks.
13There is another study (Dorn and Huberman (2002)) which analyzes, among other things, the link between psychological
variables (overcondence) and economic variables (portfolio turnover) empirically using a transaction data set of online
broker investors which is similar to ours. They measure overcondence via a questionnaire as the dierence between perceived
and actual nancial market knowledge and a self-attribution bias score. Their nding is that these overcondence measures
fail to explain additional variation in trading volume (p. 33). The overcondence measures in Dorn and Huberman (2002)
are, however, not based on the original psychological overcondence studies, a point which they themselves acknowledge as
they conclude in their paper that one should \conduct experimental tests of overcondence and compare the results with
actual trading behavior" (p. 34).
83 Overcondence as a Judgment Bias and in Finance Models
3.1 Overcondence as a Judgment Bias
In the literature on heuristics and biases there is no precise denition of overcondence.
There are several ndings that are often summarized as overcondence. Under this view,
overcondence can manifest itself in the following forms: miscalibration, too tight volatility
estimates, and the better than average eect.14 We will discuss these manifestations of
overcondence in turn.
3.1.1 Miscalibration
Studies that analyze assessments of uncertain quantities using the fractile method usu-
ally nd that people's probability distributions are too tight (Lichtenstein, Fischho, and
Phillips (1982)). For example, studies that ask people to state a 90 percent condence
interval for several uncertain quantities nd that the percentage of surprises, i.e. the per-
centage of true values that fall outside the condence interval, are higher than 10 percent,
the percentage of surprises of a perfectly calibrated person. Other studies analyze the
calibration of probability judgments. People are asked to answer questions with two an-
swer alternatives. After that, they are asked to state the probability that their answer is
correct. The usual nding is that for all questions assigned a given probability the pro-
portion of correct answers is lower than the assigned probability (Lichtenstein, Fischho,
and Phillips (1982)). There is still a debate in the psychological literature over whether
miscalibration is domain or task dependent or even a statistical illusion (see, for exam-
ple, Gigerenzer, Horage, and Kleinb olting (1991), Klayman, Soll, Gonz ales-Vallejo, and
Barlas (1999), Juslin, Winman, and Olson (2000), Erev, Wallsten, and Budescu (1994)).
However, the result that people form probability distributions over uncertain quantities
that are too tight seems to be robust especially when people judge dicult items (see
Klayman, Soll, Gonz ales-Vallejo, and Barlas (1999) or Soll and Klayman (2004)).
14Grin and Brenner (2004), for example, argue that these concepts are linked. They present theoretical perspectives
on (mis)calibration, among them the most in
uential perspective, optimistic overcondence. According to the authors,
the optimistic overcondence perspective builds, for example, on the better than average eect, unrealistic optimism, and
illusion of control.
93.1.2 Volatility estimates
There are several questionnaire studies that elicit the volatility estimate of investors by
asking for condence intervals for the return or value of an index or the return or price of
a stock in the future. These studies usually nd that the intervals provided are too tight.
Thus, historical volatilities are underestimated (see, for example, Glaser, N oth, and Weber
(2004) and Hilton (2001)). The nding that condence intervals for uncertain quantities
are too tight is usually called \miscalibration" or \overcondence" (see the subsection
above). One example is the study of Graham and Harvey (2003) which analyzes expec-
tations of risk premia, as well as their volatility and asymmetry in a panel survey. On a
quarterly basis, Chief Financial Ocers (CFOs) of U.S. corporations are asked to provide
their estimates of the market risk premium. They nd that historical volatilities are un-
derestimated. De Bondt (1998) presents results from a study of 46 individual investors.
These investors made repeated weekly forecasts of the Dow Jones Industrial Average and
of the share price of one of their main equity holdings. For 20 weeks, subjects were asked
to provide point forecasts as well as interval estimates for the value or price two or four
weeks later. One important nding is that the condence intervals are too narrow com-
pared to the actual variability of prices. Similar results are obtained by Glaser, Langer,
and Weber (2005) for students and professional stock traders.
3.1.3 Better than average eect
People think that they are above average. Taylor and Brown (1988) document in their
survey that people have unrealistically positive views of the self. One important manifesta-
tion is that people judge themselves as better than others with regard to skills or positive
personality attributes. One of the most cited examples states that 82 % of a group of
students rank themselves among the 30 percent of drivers with the highest driving safety
(Svenson (1981)).
103.2 Overcondence in Finance Models
In this subsection, we will discuss the \dierences of opinion" literature and the \overcon-
dence`" literature more comprehensively. Investors are willing to trade if their posterior
beliefs about the value of a risky asset are dierent. Theoretically, there are several ways
to \create" diering posterior beliefs.15
The \dierences of opinion" literature was, among others, motivated by Varian (1985,
1989). Varian (1989) generalizes the mean-variance framework with diverse information
of Grossman (1976) to allow for dierent prior probabilities. Each investor has a sub-
jective prior distribution for the value of the risky asset. It is assumed that these prior
distributions are normal but have dierent means. Varian (1989) nds that trading vol-
ume is entirely driven by dierences of opinion. The equilibrium net trading volume of an
investor only depends on the deviation of his opinion about the mean from the average
opinion: The larger the dierences of opinion, the larger trading volume. Harris and Raviv
(1993) assume that investors have common prior beliefs and receive public information.
Dierences of opinion are modeled by investors interpreting this information dierently,
i.e. they have dierent likelihood functions when updating probabilities. Besides assuming
diering prior beliefs, Kandel and Person (1995) model dierences of opinion as follows.
Investors receive a public signal which is the sum of two random variables: the liquidation
value of the risky asset plus a random error term. Agents disagree about the mean of the
error term. Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Person (1995) show that their respec-
tive model assumptions help explain high trading volume. Most \dierences of opinion"
models are silent about the reason why there are such dierences of opinion. Morris (1995)
and van den Steen (2001)) argue that diering prior beliefs are in line with rationality.
Shiller (1999), Barberis and Thaler (2003), Hong and Stein (2003), and Diether, Malloy,
and Scherbina (2002) regard dierences of opinion as a form of overcondence: investors
think that their knowledge or their abilities to value stocks are better than those of other
investors.16
15Varian (1989), p. 6., stresses that dierent probability beliefs may be due to dierences in information or dierences in
opinion. The distinction between information and opinion depends on how people modify their views when they discover
that other people hold dierent views.
16See also Odean (1998b), who argues that overcondence in one's information is not the only manifestation of overcon-
dence one might expect to nd in markets. He argues that traders could, instead, be overcondent about the way they
11In the remainder of this subsection, we focus on overcondence models that help explain
high levels of trading volume. Although motivated by all of its manifestations discussed
in Subsection 3.1, overcondence is exclusively modeled as overestimation of the precision
of private information. Assume there is a risky asset with liquidation value v which is a
realization of ~ v  N(0;2
~ v). Investors receive private signals ~ s = ~ v+c~ e with ~ e  N(0;2
~ e).
It is assumed that ~ v and ~ e are independent such that ~ s  N(0;2
~ v + c2  2
~ e). If c = 1,
investors are rational, if 0  c < 1, investors are overcondent. Conditional expectation
and conditional variance of ~ v, given the realization s are (assuming that ~ v and ~ e are
independent)
E[~ v j ~ s = s] = E[~ v] +
Cov[~ v; ~ s]
V ar[~ s]




~ v + c2  2
~ e
 s (1)
V ar[~ v j ~ s = s] = V ar(~ v)  









~ v + c2  2
~ e
(2)
Overcondent investors underestimate the variance of the risky asset or overestimate its
precision. Stated equivalently, their condence intervals for the value of the risky asset are
too tight. In the extreme case (c = 0), an investor even believes that he knows the value of
the risky asset with certainty. Benos (1998), Caball e and S akovics (2003), Kyle and Wang
(1997), Odean (1998b), and Wang (1998) incorporate this way of modeling overcondence
in dierent types of models such as those of Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Hellwig
(1980), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle (1985), and Kyle (1989).17 These models
dier in various dimensions. Some models assume that price takers are overcondent.
Others assume that informed insiders are overcondent and act strategically because
they know that they may in
uence the market price. Some models are one-period models,
others study multiple trading rounds. However, all the above mentioned models predict
that overcondence leads to high trading volume. At the individual level, overcondent
interpret public information rather than about the information itself. Furthermore, he emphasizes that each investor is
(over)condent in the way she interprets the information even though she \is aware of the beliefs, and perhaps even the
signals" of other investors (Odean (1998b), p. 1895).
17There are other overcondence models that address questions like the dynamics of overcondence, the survival of
overcondent investors in markets, and the cross-section of expected returns. Examples are Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sub-
rahmanyam (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001), Hirshleifer and Luo (2001), Gervais and Odean (2001),
and Wang (2001).
12investors will trade more aggressively: The higher the degree of overcondence of an
investor, the higher her or his trading volume. Odean (1998b) calls this nding \the most
robust eect of overcondence".
Throughout the paper, we maintain the two terms \dierences of opinion" literature and
\overcondence" literature. However, dierences of opinion are sometimes interpreted
as a form of overcondence, and overcondence models assume overestimation of the
precision of information, which create heterogeneous (posterior) beliefs as well or make
the additional assumption of diering beliefs that are common knowledge. Nevertheless,
the two strands of literature are usually regarded as distinct: The \dierences of opinion"
literature is usually not regarded as a part of the behavioral nance literature although
dierences of opinion are sometimes regarded as a form of overcondence, as described
above.18
4 Data Sets, Design of the Study, and Overcondence Measures
The rst two subsections of this section describe the various data sets we use and the
design of our study. Subsection 4.3 is concerned with a possible selection bias as only 215
of approximately 3,000 investors have responded to the questionnaire. The last subsection
describes the questionnaire and the various overcondence scores we calculated using the
answers of the investors.
4.1 Data Sets
This study is based on the combination of several data sets. The main data set consists
of 563,104 buy and sell transactions of 3,079 individual investors from a German online
broker in the period from January 1997 to April 2001. We considered all investors who
trade via the internet, had opened their account prior to January 1997, had at least
18The following examples highlight this point. Odean (1998b) argues that his model which assumes miscalibrated investors
is, in contrast to Harris and Raviv (1993), grounded in psychological research (Odean (1998b), p. 1891). Varian (1989) admits
that \dierences of opinion ... can be viewed as allowing for a certain kind of irrational behavior" but \remains agnostic on
this issue" as his results (trading volume is entirely driven by dierences of opinion) do not hinge on \whether we want to
call this \rational" or \irrational" " (Varian (1989), p. 7).
13one transaction in 1997, and have an e-mail-address.19 The second data set consists of
several demographic and other self-reported information (age, gender, income, investment
strategy, investment experience), that was collected by the online broker at the time each
investor opened her or his account.20 The third data set consists of the answers to an
online questionnaire that was designed to elicit several measures of overcondence (see
Subsection 4.4). Data on the securities traded are obtained from Datastream, our fourth
data source.
4.2 Design of the Study
All 3,079 investors received an e-mail from the online broker on Thursday, August, 2nd,
2001 with a link to the online questionnaire. 129 investors answered around the following
week-end. The remaining group of investors received a second e-mail on Thursday, the
20th of September, 2001. 86 investors answered around the following weekend. So, we
have a response rate of 6.98 %, which is comparable to the response rates of similar
questionnaires.21
In this study, we use the following measures of trading volume which are calculated by
the trades of the investors: the number of stock market transactions, the number of stock
market purchases, and the mean monthly stock portfolio turnover over the period from
January 1997 to April 2001. We focus on stock market transactions as the models discussed
in Section 3.2 make predictions about the link between overcondence measures and
stock market trading volume. The motivation for the use of the number of stock market
purchases as a separate measure of trading volume is as follows. Buy and sell transactions
are driven by dierent factors.22 An investor who wants to buy a security has the choice
between thousands of stocks whereas a sell decision only requires an analysis of the usually
very few stocks in the investor's own portfolio (assuming that investors do not sell short).
19See Glaser (2003) for descriptive statistics and further details. Not necessarily all orders are placed online but all
investors traded via the internet at least once in our sample period. We consider all trades by these investors, i.e. we include
the trades that were placed by telephone, for example.
20See Glaser (2003) for descriptive statistics.
21See, for example, Graham and Harvey (2003).
22See, for example, Odean (1999), p. 1294.
14Furthermore, when investors buy a security they have to consider the future performance
of the stocks they want to buy whereas they consider future as well as past performance
when they choose a security to sell. The relevance of past performance for the selling
decision is the nding of some empirical and experimental studies on the disposition
eect, the tendency to sell winners too early and ride losers too long.23 These studies
suggest that there might be explanations for the sell decision, which are, for example,
based on prospect theory (see Kahneman and Tversky (1979)).
Stock portfolio turnover in a given month is calculated as follows. We only consider stocks
that are covered in Datastream. We calculate the sum of the absolute values of purchases
and sales per month for each investor and divide this sum by the respective end-of-month
stock portfolio position. To calculate the monthly average turnover per investor we only
consider investors who have at least ve end-of-month stock portfolio positions.
To summarize, overcondence aects the expectations of future stock price performance.
The fact that, when selling a security the eect of overcondence is mixed with reference
point dependent decision behavior of investors, justies in our view a separate analysis of
buy transactions. We conjecture that the eect of overcondence is stronger when only
buying transactions are considered.
4.3 Descriptive Statistics of all Investors and the Subgroup of Respondents
to the Questionnaire
This subsection is concerned with the question of a possible sample selection bias. Table
1 compares descriptive statistics of the age, the number of transactions in all security
categories (sum over the period from January 1997 to April 2001), the number of stock
transactions (sum over the period from January 1997 to April 2001), the number of war-
rant transactions (sum over the period from January 1997 to April 2001), the average of
the monthly stock portfolio value (in EUR), the average of the monthly stock portfolio
turnover from January 1997 to April 2001, and the monthly stock portfolio performance
(see Subsection 5.3 for details) for the 2,864 investors who did not answer and the 215
23See Shefrin and Statman (1985), Odean (1998a), and Weber and Camerer (1998) for empirical and experimental evidence
on the disposition eect.
15investors who answered (at least one question of) the questionnaire. The table contains
means and medians of these variables as well as the number of observations of the respec-
tive variable (Obs.), and the number of observations of the respective variable in percent
of the number of accounts in both groups (Obs. in % of no. of accounts). The last column
presents the p-values of a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann-Whitney test). Null
hypothesis is that the two samples are from populations with the same distribution.
Table 1 shows that means and medians of all variables are similar in both groups. For
example, the median age of investors in the two groups are 39 and 38, respectively. Fur-
thermore, in both groups, about 95 % of investors are male (not shown in Table 1).
Non-parametric tests show that none of the dierences in both groups is signicant (see
last column of Table 1).24 Furthermore, even the number of observations of the respec-
tive variable in percentages of the number of accounts in both groups are similar in both
groups. For example, about 55 % of investors in both groups trade warrants. Thus, there
is no indication of a sample selection bias.25
4.4 Measures of Overcondence
We consider the following forms of overcondence: miscalibration in knowledge questions,
overcondence in volatility estimates, and the better than average eect.26 In this sub-
section, we will present the questions designed to measure overcondence as well as the
overcondence measures obtained from the answers to these questions.
4.4.1 Miscalibration (misc)
The investors were asked to state upper and lower bounds of 90 % condence intervals to
ve questions concerning general knowledge:
24See Glaser (2003) for further descriptive statistics.
25There are also no signicant dierences between investors who did not answer the questionnaire and those investors
who answered all questions. Furthermore, there are no signicant dierences between investors who answered at least one
question and investors who answered all questions.
26We also elicited illusion of control scores. These scores are neither correlated with the overcondence scores presented
in this paper nor with our trading volume measures. See the CEPR version of this paper for details (Glaser and Weber
(2003)).
161) number of shares traded of Adidas-Salomon AG on Thursday, 5/10/2000, in Ger-
many.
2) number of cars sold by BMW AG in March 2001 (worldwide).
3) number of Shell-petrol stations in Germany (end of the year 2000).
4) number of private customers of Deutsche Bank AG in Europe (May 2001).
5) number of drugstores in Germany (May 2001)).
This way of measuring the degree of miscalibration is widely used.27 137 of 215 Investors
answered at least one question. 114 investors answered all questions.28
If the correct answer lies outside the 90 % condence interval given by the investor we
call this a surprise. For the questions which were actually answered by the respondents
we calculate the percentage of surprises. Note, again, that the percentage of surprises of
well calibrated investors should be 10 %. The mean percentage of surprises 75 %. The
median is even higher (80 %). These gures are much higher than 10 %, the expected
proportion of answers outside a well calibrated 90 % condence interval. These ndings
are in line with prior research. Russo and Schoemaker (1992), for example, nd percentage
of surprises in the range from 42 % to 64 %. Other studies nd percentages of surprises
that are even closer to ours.29
4.4.2 Stock Market Forecasts (volest)
The investors were asked to provide upper and lower bounds of 90 % condence intervals to
ve questions concerning stock market forecasts (Deutscher Aktienindex DAX, Nemax50
Performance Index, three German Stocks) for the end of the year 2001.30 The use of
condence interval questions is widely used to elicit subjects' probability distributions,
27See Subsection 3.1.1 and, for example, Cesarini, Sandewall, and Johannesson (2005), Klayman, Soll, Gonz ales-Vallejo,
and Barlas (1999), Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005), Soll and Klayman (2004).
287 investors answered 1 question, 3 investors answered 2 questions, 4 investors answered 3 questions, and 9 investors
answered 4 questions.
29See, for example, Hilton (2001), p. 42, and the references therein.
30The respondents to the rst questionnaire had a forecast horizon of 21 weeks, respondents to the second questionnaire
had a 14 week horizon. We also asked for the median estimate. See Glaser and Weber (2005) for details.
17perceptions of expected returns, and variance estimations of stock returns.31
190 of 215 Investors answered at least one question. 165 investors answered all questions.32
We calculate the volatility forecasts of investors implied by their subjective condence
intervals as follows (see also Glaser and Weber (2005) or Graham and Harvey (2003)).
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(3)
t1 indicates August 2nd, t2 September 20th.34 x(p) denotes the p fractile of the stock price
or index value forecast, r(p) denotes the p fractile of the respective return forecast with
p 2 f0:05;0:5;0:95g. The ve time series are denoted by i, i 2 f1;2;3;4;5g.
The return volatility estimate of individual k, k 2 f1;:::;215g, for time series i, i 2
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31See Subsection 3.1.2, for example, Deaves, L uders, and Schr oder (2004), Graham and Harvey (2003) and Siebenmorgen
and Weber (2004) for a discussion.
324 investors answered 1 question, 6 investors answered 2 questions, 5 investors answered 3 questions, and 10 investors
answered 4 questions.
33Some studies ask directly for returns, others ask for prices. Our method of elicitation was, among others, used by Kilka
and Weber (2000).
34The exact time of response is not available. Furthermore, we do not know whether investors answered Thursday night,
or on Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. Thus, we use the Thursday closing price in both groups to calculate expected returns.
When we use the average of the Thursday closing price and the Friday closing price, the results are similar.
35For further details, see Glaser and Weber (2005).
18Keefer and Bodily (1983) show numerically that equation (4) serves as a good three-point
approximation of the standard deviation of a continuous random variable.
Glaser and Weber (2005) show that investors in the rst group underestimate the volatil-
ity of stock returns (as measured by the standard deviation of historical returns). How-
ever, after the terror attacks of September 11, volatility forecasts are higher than before
September 11. In two out of ve cases, historical volatilities are overestimated.
The terror attacks of September 11 make it impossible to include the degree of the un-
derestimation of the variance of stock returns directly in our analysis.36 Therefore, we
calculate the standardized deviation from the mean volatility estimate per investor in
each of the two groups to rank investors according to their volatility estimates. For each
investor group and for each time series we calculate the mean and the standard deviation
of the volatility forecasts. For each investor we then calculate the standardized deviation
from the mean volatility estimate by subtracting the mean volatility estimate from an
investor's volatility estimate and by dividing this dierence by the standard deviation
of the volatility forecast. For each investor, we then calculate the average across these
measures. The overcondence measure volest based on the width condence intervals for
future stock price or index value is 1 minus this standardized standard deviation.
4.4.3 Better than Average Eect (bta1 and bta2)
We measure the degree of the better than average eect using the following two questions
concerning skills and performance relative to others. Investors were asked to answer the
following two questions:
1) What percentage of customers of your discount brokerage house have better skills
(e.g. in the way they interpret information; general knowledge) than you at identi-
fying stocks with above average performance in the future? (Please give a number
between 0 % and 100 %)
2) What percentage of customers of your discount brokerage house had higher returns
than you in the four-year period from January 1997 to December 2000? (Please give
36However, we present our analysis also for the subgroup of investors that answered the questionnaire before September
11.
19a number between 0 % and 100 %)
We nd that about half of the investors assess their skills and their abilities as above
average. The median investor assesses her or his investment skills and her or his past
performance as average.
For both questions, we calculate better than average scores of investor i (bta1i and bta2i)
as
50 answeri
50 . These ratios yield 0 if respondents think they are average, 1 if they think
they are better than everybody else, and -1 if they think to be worse than everybody
else. The mean better than average scores are positive (0.12 and 0.06 for bta1 and bta2,
respectively). This result indicates a slight better than average eect. High standard
deviations are signs of large individual dierences.
4.4.4 Correlation of Overcondence Measures
Table 2 presents correlation coecients of the four overcondence measures described in
the previous subsections as well as the signicance level of each correlation coecient and
the number of observations used in calculating the correlation coecient.
The two miscalibration scores based on subjective condence intervals, misc and volest,
are signicantly positively correlated (p = 0:0001). The Spearman rank correlation co-
ecient is 0.3377. Although knowledge questions and stock market prediction questions
are completely dierent tasks, we nd stable individual dierences in the degree of mis-
calibration. This nding is in line with several psychological studies (see, for example,
Alba and Hutchinson (2000), Klayman, Soll, Gonz ales-Vallejo, and Barlas (1999), Pallier,
Wilkinson, Danthiir, Kleitman, Knezevic, Stankov, and Roberts (2002), Soll (1996), Soll
and Klayman (2004), and Stanovich and West (1998)). Usually, individual dierences are
especially strong when subjects are asked to state subjective condence intervals (see,
for example, Klayman, Soll, Gonz ales-Vallejo, and Barlas (1999), p. 240). Furthermore,
Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) also use ten condence interval questions to
rank people and show the psychometric validity of their miscalibration measure using
the Cronbach alpha. Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005) show that even ve condence
interval questions are enough to reliably rank subjects with regard to their degree of
miscalibration.
20The two better than average scores, bta1 and bta2, have a correlation coecient of 0.6461
(p < 0:0001). Investors who rank themselves as above average with regard to investment
skills also assess their past portfolio performance as above average when compared to other
investors. This nding, again, points to psychometric internal validity of this concept.
Most of the other correlations between overcondence scores are insignicant. Some are
even negative. The lack of correlation between our overcondence measures is consistent
with ndings of other recent studies that are similar to this part of our study. Deaves,
L uders, and Luo (2003) measure miscalibration and the better than average eect using
our questions or a slightly changed version of our questions.37 Their correlation matrix also
shows no signicant positive correlations. Oberlechner and Osler (2003) nd a negative
(but statistically and economically insignicant) correlation between miscalibration and
the better than average eect using a questionnaire similar to ours. R egner, Hilton, Ca-
bantous and Vautier (2004) nd little or now correlation between miscalibration, positive
illusions such as unrealistic optimism, a general tendency to consider oneself as better
than average, and illusion of control. Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005) also nd that
miscalibration and the better than average eect are unrelated.38
Our results and the results in the literature can be summarized as follows:
 There are stable individual dierences in reasoning or decision making competence
(see Parker and Fischho (2005), Stanovich and West (1998), and Stanovich and
West (2000)).
 There are stable individual dierences in the degree of overcondence within tasks
(see Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005), Jonsson and Allwood (2003), Klayman, Soll,
Gonz ales-Vallejo, and Barlas (1999), R egner, Hilton, Cabantous and Vautier (2004)).
This is consistent with the common modeling assumption in nance that investors
with dierent degrees of overcondence can be regarded as dierent investor \types"
(see, for example, Benos (1998)).
 People often show dierent levels of overcondence depending on the task or domain
but the same rank-order over tasks or domains (see Jonsson and Allwood (2003),
37We also analyzed illusion of control. See Glaser and Weber (2003).
38Larrick, Burson, and Soll (2005) nd, however, that miscalibration and the better than average eect can be positively
correlated when they are both elicited for the same task or in the same domain.
21p. 561, and Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005)). Note, that to test the hypothesis
that, the higher overcondence the higher trading volume, not the amount or level
of overcondence but the ranking of investors is important.
 There is evidence that overcondence and the rank order across people is stable over
time (see Jonsson and Allwood (2003) or Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005)).
 Overcondence scores based on condence interval tasks and better than average
scores are not correlated (see Deaves, L uders, and Luo (2003), Glaser, Langer, and
Weber (2005), Oberlechner and Osler (2003), or R egner, Hilton, Cabantous and Vau-
tier (2004)).
5 Overcondence and Trading Volume: Empirical Results
5.1 Cross-Sectional Regressions
This section presents cross-sectional regression results on the relation between the three
measures of trading volume (logarithm of the number of stock market transactions, log-
arithm of the number of stock market purchases, logarithm of mean monthly turnover)
and the overcondence measures described in Section 4.4 (see Tables 4, 5, and 6).39
Table 4 presents regression results on the relation between the logarithm of the num-
ber of stock market transactions and several explanatory variables that are known to
aect nancial decision making (a gender dummy variable, age, a warrant trader dummy
variable, a high risk investment strategy dummy, the logarithm of mean monthly stock
portfolio value, and information in hours per week).40 Table 3 once again summarizes and
denes dependent and independent variables of the cross-sectional regression analysis and
presents their respective data source. The information variable is included to control for
the level of commitment or involvement. The intuition behind this is the nding of some
39We use the natural logarithm of the stock portfolio value, and the three trading volume measures as these variables are
positively skewed. Tests show, that we thus avoid problems like non-normality, non-linearity, and heteroscedasticity in the
cross-sectional regression analysis. See Spanos (1986), chapter 21, especially, pp. 455-456, Davidson and McKinnon (1993),
chapter 14, and Atkinson (1985), pp. 80-81.
40See, e.g., Barber and Odean (2001), Dorn and Huberman (2002), Glaser (2003), Glaser and Weber (2004), or Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001).
22studies that overcondence increases with the level of active involvement in a task.41 We
regard the information variable as a proxy for the level of involvement in the task of
investing or trading.
In regressions (1) to (6), we consider all investors. In regressions (7) to (12), investors
in the highest turnover quintile are excluded. This is motivated by the following nding.
Glaser (2003) shows that the stock portfolio value in the highest turnover quintile is very
low. The median value is about 10,000 Euro. The fact that the median of the average
stock portfolio value across months is very low in the highest turnover quintile (median
of monthly turnover is 166 %) is important. Thus, we cannot dismiss the argument that
these accounts are entertainment accounts that are characterized by low portfolio values
and high turnover ratios so that the potential eect of overcondence is swamped.42
Regressions (1) and (7) report the results for the respective subgroup of investors that
has responded to the questionnaire without an overcondence measure. In each of the
following regressions we include one overcondence variable (Overcondence).43
Only the better than average scores (Regressions (5), (11), and (12)) are signicantly
positively related with the number of stock market transactions. However, miscalibrated
investors do not exhibit a higher trading volume.
Other variables that signicantly aect the number of stock market transactions are the
warrant trader dummy variable (positive sign) and the mean monthly stock portfolio
value (positive sign). Investors who trade warrants do trade more stocks and the higher
the value of the stock portfolio the higher the number of transactions.44 The warrant trader
dummy variable might be interpreted as a measure of investor sophistication. Bank-issued
warrants are comparable to options but with some institutional dierences. For example,
41See, for example, Presson and Benassi (1996), p. 496.
42Glaser (2003) presents further characteristics of investors in the highest turnover quintile which strengthen this conjec-
ture. For example, about 70 % of investors in the highest turnover quintile actively trade warrants and only 1.39 % of these
investors use their account for retirement savings.
43Note, that we assume that overcondence is a stable individual trait and thus constant over time. This assumption is
consistent with static overcondence models presented Subsection 3.2. Experimental studies indeed show stability over time
for the concept of miscalibration (see, for example, Jonsson and Allwood (2003) or Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005)). We
analyze the implications of dynamic overcondence models with a time-varying degree of overcondence in Subsection 5.3.
44See Glaser (2003) for further results on the general determinants of trading volume in the whole data set.
23warrants are always issued by nancial institutions (see Schmitz, Glaser, and Weber (2005)
for details).
Perhaps surprising, gender is not signicantly related to our trading volume measures.
This contradicts the ndings of Barber and Odean (2001) who nd that men trade more
than women. However, our results are consistent with other studies analyzing the behavior
of investors such as Dorn and Huberman (2002), Glaser (2003), Glaser and Weber (2004),
and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). These studies show that the sign and the signicance
of the gender variable depends on the specication of the regression.
Buy and sell transactions are driven by dierent factors. As hypothesized in Section
4.2, the eect of overcondence is stronger when only buy transactions are considered.
Therefore, we analyze the number of purchases separately. The results show that our
conjecture is conrmed. Table 5 presents regression results on the relation between the
logarithm of the number of stock market purchases and several explanatory variables.
Both bta1 and bta2 are signicant in Regressions (5), (11), and (12). The t-values are, as
hypothesized, higher than in the respective regressions in Table 4.
Table 6 presents regression results on the relation between the logarithm of mean monthly
turnover and the same explanatory variables. None of the overcondence measures is
signicantly related to turnover in Regressions (1) to (6). The main determinants of
turnover are the warrant trader dummy (positive sign) and the mean monthly stock
portfolio value (negative sign). The last observation is consistent with the nding that
the median of the average stock portfolio value across months is very low in the highest
turnover quintile.
When we exclude investors in the highest turnover quintile and run the regressions just for
the remaining investors, Tables 4, 5, and 6 show that the eect of the better than average
scores on trading volume are always stronger, as predicted. The miscalibration score (misc)
has no signicant impact and the signs of the coecients are, contrary to theory, mainly
negative (Regression (9) in Table 6 is the only exception). Furthermore, the adjusted
R-squared values in in Regressions (7) to (12) are usually higher than in the respective
Regressions (1) to (6) when all respondents to the questionnaire are analyzed. This stresses
our previous conjecture that the level of trading volume in the highest turnover quintile
24are driven by factors that are unobserved. In addition, the adjusted R-squared values in
Regressions (5), (6), (11), and (12) are higher when the better than average scores are
included when compared to the respective Regressions (1) and (7) in each table without
an overcondence measure as explanatory variable. Thus, the better than average scores
explain additional variation of the trading volume measures. This increase in the adjusted
R-squared values is higher in Regressions (8) to (12) than in the respective Regressions
(2) to (6) that analyze all respondents to the questionnaire suggesting, again, that the
accounts with the highest turnover values might be entertainment accounts.
Note, however, that the increase of the adjusted R-squared values as a result of the
inclusion of the better than average scores in the regressions compared to the Regressions
(1) and (7) is not very big. These results might be interpreted in the way that behavioral
or psychological factors matter but they are by far not the whole story. Other (rational
or unobserved (rational or psychological)) factors also determine trading volume.
5.2 Robustness Checks
All the results in this subsection are robust as unreported regression results show. The
better than average scores remain signicant for dierent sets of explanatory variables.
Miscalibration scores are never signicantly positive. Furthermore, most of the overcon-
dence measures are not signicantly correlated with other explanatory variables. Only the
better than average scores are signicantly positively related to the information variable.
In addition, the overcondence measures are not signicantly dierent for men/women,
warrant-trader/non-warrant-trader, and investors that describe their investment strategy
as high-risk/not high-risk. Thus, our overcondence measures seem to capture investor
characteristics that dier from other determinants of trading volume.
The results also hold for dierent turnover denitions. We also analyzed another measure
of trading activity, the average volume per transaction. The models presented in Sub-
section 3.2 also predict larger bets for overcondent investors. We nd that the average
volume per transaction is almost completely driven by the stock portfolio value: the higher
the stock portfolio value, the higher the average volume per transaction (see also Glaser
(2003)). When we scale the average volume per transaction by the stock portfolio value,
25the only signicant variable is, again, the stock portfolio value, but with a negative sign.
We also interpreted the number of stock transactions and the number of stock purchases as
(overdispersed) count data (see, for example, Wooldridge (2002) and Winkelmann (2003)).
Overdispersion means that the variance of the number of stock transactions is larger than
the mean of the number of stock transactions. In our data set, the variance of the number
of stock transactions is 32,533 whereas the mean of the number of stock transactions is
105 (see Glaser (2003)). When we use appropriate regression models (Poisson regression
model, negative binomial regression model), the results and conclusions are similar to the
results of the ordinary least squares regressions presented in this subsection.
We used a logarithmic transformation of some regression variables (see footnote 39).
An applied-econometricians' rule-of-thumb to avoid problems like non-normality, non-
linearity, and heteroscedasticity is to use the logarithmic transformation of positively
skewed variables (see Spanos (1986)). The transformed variables are approximately nor-
mally distributed. A more formal way to transform variables is to use the Box-Cox trans-
formation. In regressions using the Box-Cox transformation of dependent and independent
variables, our basic results are even stronger.
5.3 Portfolio Performance and Overcondence
Up to this point in the paper we maintained the assumption that overcondence is a
stable individual trait and thus constant over time. This assumption is consistent with
overcondence models presented in Subsection 3.2 and experimental evidence (see Jonsson
and Allwood (2003) and Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005)). Note, that this assumption is
necessary to argue that a high overcondence score, measured at the end of the sample pe-
riod, leads to high trading volume during the sample period, as overcondence is constant
through time and it does not matter when overcondence is measured. However, there are
other models assuming that overcondence dynamically changes over time (see, e.g., Ger-
vais and Odean (2001)). This modeling assumption is usually motivated by psychological
studies that nd biased self-attribution (see Wolosin, Sherman, and Till (1973), Langer
and Roth (1975), Miller and Ross (1975), Schneider, Hastorf, and Ellsworth (1979)): Peo-
ple overestimate the degree to which they are responsible for their own success. In these
26overcondence models, the degree of overcondence is a function of past investment suc-
cess, i.e. the higher the performance in the past the higher the degree of overcondence
at the end of the period (learning-to-be-overcondent hypothesis; Gervais and Odean
(2001)).45 There is another story that involves a time-varying degree of overcondence.
Assume that (some) investors are overcondent at the start of the sample period. As a
consequence, they trade more. If high trading volume is associated with low returns, the
most overcondent investors at the beginning of the sample period might end up with the
lowest overcondence measures at the end of the period as a consequence of high trading
volume (and low returns) during the sample period.
To empirically test these two stories, we correlate overcondence scores with the perfor-
mance of the investors in the past.46 Moreover, we are able to analyze whether investors
who assess their investment skills or performance as above average compared to others
really had above average performance in the past. Furthermore, we analyze the relation
between portfolio performance and portfolio turnover.
We calculate the monthly gross portfolio performance of each investor making the follow-
ing simplifying assumptions:
- We assume that all stocks are bought and sold at the end of the month.
- We ignore intra-month trading.
Barber and Odean (2000) show that these simplifying assumptions do not bias the mea-
surement of portfolio performance.
The gross portfolio return R
gr












Rit is the return of stock i in month t, Sht is the number of stocks held by individual h
in month t, Pit is the price of stock i at the beginning of month t, and niht is the number
45See Glaser, N oth, and Weber (2004) for a further discussion of these models.
46Another possibility to test the learning-to-be-overcondent hypothesis is to analyze the link between past returns and
trading volume. See Section 6 for further details and Glaser and Weber (2004) for an empirical study of this issue.
27of stocks of company i held by investor h in month t. wiht is the beginning-of-month-t
market value of the holding of stock i of investor h divided by the beginning-of-month-t
market value of the whole stock portfolio of investor h.
The cross-sectional distribution of the monthly gross returns is similar to the results in
Barber and Odean (2000), Table IV, p. 791. We observe a large cross-sectional variation
in the performance across investors. When we exclude investors with stock positions in
12 or fewer months, we nd gross returns between  16% and +24% per month. On
average, investors underperform relevant benchmarks. For example, the arithmetic average
monthly return of the German blue chip index DAX from January 1997 to March 2001 is
2:02% whereas the mean gross monthly return of investors in our data set is 0:54%.
We nd that investors who trade more do not have higher monthly gross returns. We
cannot reject the hypothesis that monthly gross returns are equal in turnover quintiles
using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test.47
Furthermore, we do not nd signicant correlations between the monthly gross return in
our 51 month period and our overcondence measures.48 High returns in the past do not
lead to high overcondence measures in our questionnaire at the end of the sample period.
Thus, we do not nd support for the learning-to-be-overcondent hypothesis, i.e. a high
degree of overcondence as a result of past investment success. Furthermore we do not
nd support for the second story presented at the beginning of this subsection as we do
not nd a signicant correlation between overcondence and (gross) performance.
The results of this subsection might be explained by the following ndings. Investors are
not able to give a correct assessment of their own past realized portfolio performance. We
asked the investors to give an estimate of the past realized stock portfolio performance
47Note, that Barber and Odean (2000) nd exactly the same result for gross returns (Barber and Odean (2000), Figure
1, p. 775). The underperformance of investors who trade more is completely driven by transaction costs.
48We also checked the robustness of this result. Past returns over the past 12, 6, and 3 months are also not related to our
overcondence measures. Note, however, that there are about four months between the end of our observation period and the
date the questionnaire was answered. Furthermore, cross-sectional regressions with an overcondence measure as dependent
variable and several sets of explanatory variables (past realized returns over various horizons; variables mentioned in Table 1)
do not yield a clear picture or signicant results. This complements the ndings mentioned before that our overcondence
measures are not signicantly correlated with other explanatory variables. We conclude that our overcondence scores
measure traits or investor characteristics that are orthogonal to past returns or other explanatory variables.
28of their account at the online broker. Glaser and Weber (2004) show that the correlation
between the assessment of past (absolute) portfolio performance and realized portfolio
performance is negative (but insignicant). Furthermore, they nd that past market re-
turns have a stronger impact on trading activity than past portfolio returns of an investor.
This nding is consistent with a result of Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2004) who state
that \not only does that impact of past market returns on a typical security's trading
activity survive the inclusion of lagged security returns in the same regression, it appears
that the lagged market return impact is actually larger" (Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink
(2004), p. 22). These ndings are no surprise when investors have a better knowledge of
market returns compared to the returns of the stocks in their own portfolio.
Moreover, investors are not able to give a correct assessment of their performance relative
to others. We grouped all investors in percentiles based on their past realized stock port-
folio performance. The correlation between the assessment of past portfolio performance
compared to others (via percentiles; see the bta2 measure in Subsection 4.4.3) and actual
percentile is negative (but insignicant). Furthermore, the dierence between the actual
return percentile of the respective investor and the self-assessed percentile is positive on
average (this dierence is positive if an investor thinks, for example, that only 25% of the
other investors had higher portfolio returns in the past even though 30 % of the investors
in the sample actually had higher returns). Thus, investors overestimate their relative
position in terms of return percentiles. The result that there is a poor correlation between
such subjective and objective measures or between self-ratings of skill and actual perfor-
mance is a common nding in the literature (see, for example, Larrick, Burson, and Soll
(2005) or Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004) for references.)
The results of this subsection can be summarized as follows:
- Investors who trade more have, on average, the same gross monthly returns as in-
vestors who trade less.
- Investment success in the past does not lead to high overcondence scores at the end
of the sample period.
- Investors have diculties in estimating their own past realized stock portfolio per-
formance.
29- Investors who think that they had above average performance actually did not have
above average performance in the past.
6 Discussion
We show that overcondence as measured by calibration questions is not sigicantly re-
lated to trading volume. This result is inconsistent with theory but consistent with ndings
of Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005). Note, again, that overcondence models
almost exclusively model overcondence via miscalibrated investors. Why is miscalibra-
tion not positively related to trading volume, as predicted by overcondence models? One
important point to remember is that the link between miscalibration and trading vol-
ume has never been shown or even analyzed empirically or experimentally. Biais, Hilton,
Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) and our study are the only exceptions that analyze this link.
We nd that investors who think that they are above average do trade more. Deaves,
L uders, and Luo (2003) measure miscalibration and the better than average eect using
questions similar to ours and correlate these overcondence scores with trading activity
in an experimental asset market. They also nd that people who think that they are
above average trade more.49 Oberlechner and Osler (2003), p. 27, also argue and nd
that the better than average eect, not miscalibration, explains excess trading volume
using survey data from U.S. currency market professionals. Our results are also consistent
with Graham, Harvey, and Huang (2005). They nd that investors who feel competent
trade more often. Our better than average questions can also be interpreted as perceived
competence. Our ndings are also related to Hales (2005). He shows experimentally that
a willingness to engage in speculative trade in laboratory markets is largely driven by a
failure of traders to account for information about value implicit in other trader's actions.
He argues that this behavior arises because traders construct myopic mental models that
49Furthermore, Deaves, L uders, and Luo (2003) nd that the degree of miscalibration is related to trading activity which
is consistent with overcondence models. However, experimental subjects were told that those who had exhibited higher
general knowledge in the questionnaire would receive more accurate private noisy signals in the experimental asset market.
Deaves, L uders, and Luo (2003) even admit that \overcondent people will tend to think that their answers are more
accurate, implying that their signals are more revealing and trade accordingly" (Deaves, L uders, and Luo (2003), p. 8).
Thus, their \miscalibration score" just captures another facet of the better than average eect.
30ignore the perspective of other traders. This can be explained by the fact that some
investors think that they are better than others.
The nding that investors who think that they are above average do trade more is in line
with the dierences of opinion literature. Although this strand of literature is, as discussed
in Subsection 3.2, usually not regarded as a part of the behavioral nance literature and
although dierences of opinion can be motivated rationally we propose a psychological
motivation of the dierences in opinions assumption. This conjecture is not completely
new (see Shiller (1999), Barberis and Thaler (2003), Hong and Stein (2003), and Diether,
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002)). In their model of trading in speculative markets based
on dierences of opinion among traders, Harris and Raviv (1993) state that, \we assume
that each speculator is absolutely convinced that his or her model is correct. Indeed,
each group believes the other group is basing its decision on an incorrect model (i.e. is
irrational in this sense)".50 Although Harris and Raviv (1993) stress that they \maintain
the assumption of rational agents", this assumption is in line with the nding that people
think that they are above average in terms of investment skills. Shiller (1999), for example,
argues that \if we connect the phenomenon of overcondence with the phenomenon of
anchoring, we see the origins of dierences of opinion among investors, and some of the
source of the high volume of trade among investors. ... Apparently, many investors do feel
that they do have speculative reasons to trade often, and apparently this must have to do
with some tendency for each individual to have beliefs that he or she perceives as better
than others' beliefs. It is as if most people think they are above average."51.
There are other studies which show empirically that dierences in opinion creates trad-
ing volume. Bamber, Barron, and Stober (1999) and Antweiler and Frank (2004) are two
examples. Bamber, Barron, and Stober (1999) measure dierential interpretations using
data on analysts' revisions of forecasts of annual earnings after the announcement of quar-
terly earnings. They nd that dierential interpretations explain a signicant amount of
trading. Antweiler and Frank (2004) study the eect of more than 1.5 million messages
posted on Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull about the 45 companies in the Dow Jones In-
dustrial Average and the Dow Jones Internet Index. They nd that disagreement among
50Harris and Raviv (1993), p. 480.
51Shiller (1999), pp. 1322-1323.
31the posted Internet messages is associated with increased trading volume. Glaser and
Weber (2004) nd that both past market returns as well as past portfolio returns aect
trading activity of individual investors. However, the eect of market returns on subse-
quent trading volume is stronger. These ndings show that an overcondence story (or,
to be more precise, the learning-to-be-overcondent hypothesis) is at best only one part
of the story because as it is unclear why past market returns should aect trading vol-
ume. This is even more so as Glaser and Weber (2004), using survey data of this investor
sample, show that individual investors in this investor sample are unable to give a correct
estimate of their own past realized stock portfolio performance. One explanation of why
past market returns should aect trading activity is that high past market returns might
increase dierences of opinion. In their survey of CFO stock return expectations, Graham
and Harvey (2003) show that past market returns are related to dierences of opinion.
High past (absolute) returns lead to higher dierences of opinion.52
Besides mentioning the strengths of our approach - the ability to directly test the hy-
pothesis that a higher degree of overcondence leads to higher trading volume - we want
to discuss some possible weaknesses as well. We conducted the questionnaire part of our
study via the internet. Internet experiments increase the variance of responses when com-
pared to experiments in a controlled laboratory environment (Anderhub, M uller, and
Schmidt (2001)). Thus, too much noise might be a possible reason why we are unable
to prove a link between miscalibration scores and measures of trading volume. We note,
however, that Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) nd results similar to ours in
a controlled environment. Furthermore, if we nd a signicant eect despite the noise
inherent in internet questionnaires, such as in the case of the better than average scores,
we can be very condent about the presence of this link in reality.
52Although Graham and Harvey (2003) nd that both large negative and positive returns aect dierences of opinion, we
argue that negative returns that are associated with dierences of opinion do not lead to the same level of trading activity
as positive returns in connection with dierences of opinion. Negative returns are associated with paper losses and investors
usually are reluctant to realize these paper losses. See Shefrin and Statman (1985), Odean (1998a), and Weber and Camerer
(1998).
327 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is to measure overcondence of a group of online broker
investors in various dimensions (miscalibration, volatility estimates, better than average
eect) and to analyze whether these overcondence measures are signicantly related with
trading volume of individual investors.
One implication of our study is that one has to be careful when deriving theoretical as-
sumptions from psychological experiments unrelated to nancial tasks. It is important
to specify what kind of overcondence may be in
uencing trading behavior. Hirshleifer
(2001), for example, argues that \it is often not obvious how to translate preexisting ev-
idence from psychological experiments into assumptions about investors in real nancial
settings. Routine experimental testing of the assumptions and conclusions of asset-pricing
theories is needed to guide modeling."53 It is especially important for descriptive behav-
ioral nance theories to model as precisely as possible.
We nd that investors who think that they are above average trade more and are thus
able to conrm other recent papers (Deaves, L uders, and Luo (2003), Graham, Harvey,
and Huang (2005), Hales (2005)). One of the most striking results of our study is that
overcondence, as measured by calibration questions, is unrelated to trading volume. This
result seems to be robust as Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) report similar
ndings. These results are even more important as theoretical models that incorporate
overcondent investors mainly motivate this assumption by the calibration literature and
model overcondence as underestimation of the variance of signals (or overestimation
of their precision), i.e. by too tight condence intervals. In connection with other recent
ndings, we conclude that the usual way of motivating and modeling overcondence which
is mainly based on the calibration literature has to be treated with caution.
But why is it important to look at subtle modeling dierences? Descriptive models have
to be as precise as possible and have to rely on empirical and experimental observations.
This is also discussed in Hales (2005). He provides evidence that a willingness to engage
in speculative trade is largely driven by a failure to account for information about value
53Hirshleifer (2001), p. 1577.
33implicit in other trader's actions. Unlike overcondence models, which focus on erroneous
estimates of signal precision, these participants do not trade too much because they un-
derestimate the error of noisy signals. Rather, participants engage in too much speculative
trade because they tend not to think about the implications of disagreement. The evi-
dence presented in Hales (2005) also supports the general technique of modeling investor
behavior using dierences of opinion by showing that, even though traders are capable
of adjusting for other's behavior, they will not naturally do so. He also argues that, as a
result, investors might often act like they believe they are better than average traders (or
have better than average information).
There are several suggestions for future research. We measure various facets of overcon-
dence. Numerous studies suggest or argue, at least implicitly, that these manifestations
of overcondence are related. In other words: answers to experimental tasks should be
positively correlated. Our study is a hint that this need not be the case. Future research
should further analyze whether overcondence is a robust phenomenon across several tasks
that are often assumed to be related. Furthermore, our way of empirically evaluating be-
havioral nance models - the correlation of economic and psychological variables and the
combination of psychometric measures of judgment biases (such as overcondence scores)
and eld data - seems to be a promising way to better understand which psychologi-
cal phenomena drive economic behavior. This empirical methodology should be routinely
used to guide modeling.
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42Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Investors who Answered versus Investors who did not Answer
the Questionnaire
This table compares descriptive statistics of the age, the number of transactions in all security categories
(sum over the period from January 1997 to April 2001), the number of stock transactions (sum over the
period from January 1997 to April 2001), the number of warrant transactions (sum over the period from
January 1997 to April 2001), the average of the monthly stock portfolio value (in EUR), the average of
the monthly stock portfolio turnover from January 1997 to April 2001, and the monthly stock portfolio
performance (see Subsection 5.3 for details) for the 2,864 investors who did not answer and the 215
investors who answered the questionnaire. The table contains means and medians of these variables as
well as the number of observations of the respective variable (Obs.), and the number of observations of
the respective variable in percent of the number of accounts in both groups (Obs. in % of no. of accounts).
The last column presents the p-values of a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Mann-Whitney test).
Null hypothesis is that the two samples are from populations with the same distribution.
Investors who Investors who p-value
did not answer answered (Mann-Whitney test)
questionnaire questionnaire
No. of accounts 2,864 215
Age Mean 40.92 40.02 0.2942
Median 39 38
Obs. 2,369 183
Obs. in % of no. of accounts 82.72 85.12
Transactions Mean 184.89 156.17 0.5621
Median 103 105
Obs. 2,864 215
Obs. in % of no. of accounts 100.00 100.00
Stock transactions Mean 106.37 92.87 0.9422
Median 54 52
Obs. 2,793 205
Obs. in % of no. of accounts 97.52 95.35
Warrant transactions Mean 88.99 69.81 0.8194
Median 27 29
Obs. 1530 120
Obs. in % of no. of accounts 53.42 55.81
Stock portfolio Mean 36590.83 37061.01 0.5614
value Median 15629.70 15887.10
Obs. 2,762 202
Obs. in % of no. of accounts 96.44 93.95
Stock portfolio Mean 1.37 1.21 0.9692
turnover Median 0.33 0.33
Obs. 2,675 199
Obs. in % of no. of accounts 93.40 92.56
Stock portfolio Mean 0.0056 0.0030 0.4538
performance Median 0.0057 0.0053
Obs. 2,598 195
Obs. in % of no. of accounts 90.71 90.70
43Table 2: Correlation of Overcondence Variables
This table presents pairwise Spearman rank correlation coecient between our overcondence measures
described in Subsection 4.4 as well as the signicance level of each correlation coecient (in parentheses)
and the number of observations used in calculating the correlation coecient. misc denotes the percentage
of surprises in knowledge questions. volest is an overcondence measure based on the width of condence
intervals for future stock prices or index values. bta1 is a better than average score based on self-assessment
of investment skills in relation to other investors' investment skills. bta2 denotes a better than average
score based on self-assessment of past performance in relation to other investors' past performance. *
indicates signicance at 10%; *** indicates signicance at 1%.






bta1 -0.0327 -0.0304 1
(0.7040) (0.6774)
137 190 212
bta2 0.1708 -0.0077 0.6461 1
(0.0460)* (0.9164) (< 0:0001)***
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